Victoria’s Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (Vic) became the first state law to permit VAD in Australia under limited circumstances from June 2019. Before this, many palliative care physicians relied on the doctrine of double effect (DDE) to justify the use of pain relievers for terminally ill patients that were known to hasten death. The DDE claims that there is a morally significant difference between intending evil and merely foreseeing some bad side-effect will occur as a result of one’s actions. (...) This article argues that the legacy of the DDE is promoting inequitable access to VAD in Victoria due to the assumption that death represents an “evil” for the patient and that the intentions of physicians providing VAD cannot be trusted. The latter claim relies on two common objections to the DDE: the risk of “purifying the intentions” and the issue of “closeness” when evaluating moral acts under this theory. (shrink)

This paper presents a clinically orientated illustration of the doctrine of double effect. The case of an elderly gentleman with advanced cancer is discussed, with particular emphasis on two dilemmas encountered during the terminal phase of his illness. The author describes how the doctrine of double effect was applied to help the team make some complex management decisions.

The vast majority (> 95%) of single-gene mutations in yeast affect not only the expression of the mutant gene, but also the expression of many other genes. These data suggest the presence of a previously uncharacterized ‘gene expression network’—a set of interactions between genes which dictate gene expression in the native cell environment. Here, we quantitatively analyze the gene expression network revealed by microarray expression data from 273 different yeast gene deletion mutants.(1) We find that gene expression interactions form a (...) robust, error-tolerant ‘scale-free’ network, similar to metabolic pathways(2) and artificial networks such as power grids and the internet.(3-5) Because the connectivity between genes in the gene expression network is unevenly distributed, a scale-free organization helps make organisms resistant to the deleterious effects of mutation, and is thus highly adaptive. The existence of a gene expression network poses practical considerations for the study of gene function, since most mutant phenotypes are the result of changes in the expression of many genes. Using principles of scale-free network topology, we propose that fragmenting the gene expression network via ‘genome-engineering’ may be a viable and practical approach to isolating gene function. BioEssays 24:267–274, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.; DOI 10.1002/bies.10054. (shrink)

Faz-se necessário urgentemente que a arte retorne às suas fontes legítimas. Faz-se imprescindível que adquiramos uma perfeita consciência, direi mais, um perfeito comportamento artístico diante da vida, uma atitude estética, disciplinada, livre, mas legítima, severa apesar de insubmissa, disciplina de todo o ser, para que alcancemos realmente a arte. Só então o indivíduo retornará ao humano. Porque na arte verdadeira o humano é a fatalidade. (Mário de Andrade – O Baile das Quatro Artes).

Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.

Il saggio descrive e analizza la teoria della rappresentazionalità presentata da Kendall Walton in Mimesi come far finta. Le rappresentazioni sono supporti atti a suscitare un far finta che si esplica come un immaginare proposizionale: ecco la tesi dell’autore. I caratteri di tale far finta, la dinamica della partecipazione, la distinzione tra figuralità e verbalità, e il problema delle entità fittizie, sono i punti cardine della proposta waltoniana. La questione dell’esperienza, e la sua possibile, originaria, tematizzazione estetica; il tema (...) del rapporto tra emozioni fittizie e reali; e la maniera specifica in cui l’autore intende la mimesi della rappresentazione, sono, in particolare, gli aspetti che il saggio problematizza più estesamente. The essay is intended to describe while analyzing the theory of representationality as presented by Kendall Walton in Mimesis as Make-Believe. Representations are mediums leading to provoke a make-believe – its kind building up as propositional acts of imagination: such the thesis that the author asserts. Features of this make-believe, the dynamics of participation, the distinction between figurality and verbality, the problem of fictional entities, those are the nodal joints of the waltonian proposal. The question of experience – and its possible, originary, aesthetical thematization, the thematization of the relation between fictional and real emotions, and the specific sense in which the author draws the mimesis proper to representation: such the aspects which the present essay is mostly concerned with. (shrink)

I propose a way of understanding empathy on which it does not necessarily involve any-thing like thinking oneself into another’s shoes, or any imagining at all. Briefly, the empa-thizer uses an aspect of her own mental state as a sample, expressed by means of a phenomenal concept, to understand the other person. This account does a better job of explaining the connection between empathetic experiences and the objects of empathy than most traditional ones do. And it helps to clarify the (...) relations among different varieties of empathy and empathy-like experiences, including empathy with fictional characters. -/- . (shrink)

That photography is a supremely realistic medium may be the commonsense view, but—as Edward Steichen reminds us—it is by no means universal. Dissenters note how unlike reality a photograph is and how unlikely we are to confuse the one with the other. They point to “distortions” engendered by the photographic process and to the control which the photographer exercises over the finished product, the opportunities he enjoys for interpretation and falsification. Many emphasize the expressive nature of the medium, observing that (...) photographs are inevitably colored by the photographer’s personal interests, attitudes, and prejudices.1 Whether any of these various considerations really does collide with photography’s claim of extraordinary realism depends, of course, on how that claim is to be understood.Those who find photographs especially realistic sometimes think of photography as a further advance in a direction which many picture makers have taken during the last several centuries, as a continuation or culmination of the post-Renaissance quest for realism.2 There is some truth in this. Such earlier advances toward realism include the development of perspective and modeling techniques, the portrayal of ordinary and incidental details, attention to the effects of light, and so on. From its very beginning, photography mastered perspective. Subtleties of shading, gradations of brightness nearly impossible to achieve with the brush, became commonplace. Photographs include as a matter of course the most mundane details of the scenes they portray—stray chickens, facial warts, clutters of dirty dishes. Photographic images easily can seem to be what painters striving for realism have always been after. 2. See André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” What is Cinema?, trans. Hugh Gray, vol. 1, p. 12; all further references to this work, abbreviated “OPI,” will be included in the text. See also Rudolf Arnheim, “Melancholy Unshaped,” Toward a Psychology of Art: Collected Essays, p. 186. Kendall L. Walton is professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. He is currently completing a book on representation in the arts. (shrink)

That photography is a supremely realistic medium may be the commonsense view, but—as Edward Steichen reminds us—it is by no means universal. Dissenters note how unlike reality a photograph is and how unlikely we are to confuse the one with the other. They point to “distortions” engendered by the photographic process and to the control which the photographer exercises over the finished product, the opportunities he enjoys for interpretation and falsification. Many emphasize the expressive nature of the medium, observing that (...) photographs are inevitably colored by the photographer’s personal interests, attitudes, and prejudices.1 Whether any of these various considerations really does collide with photography’s claim of extraordinary realism depends, of course, on how that claim is to be understood.Those who find photographs especially realistic sometimes think of photography as a further advance in a direction which many picture makers have taken during the last several centuries, as a continuation or culmination of the post-Renaissance quest for realism.2 There is some truth in this. Such earlier advances toward realism include the development of perspective and modeling techniques, the portrayal of ordinary and incidental details, attention to the effects of light, and so on. From its very beginning, photography mastered perspective . Subtleties of shading, gradations of brightness nearly impossible to achieve with the brush, became commonplace. Photographs include as a matter of course the most mundane details of the scenes they portray—stray chickens, facial warts, clutters of dirty dishes. Photographic images easily can seem to be what painters striving for realism have always been after. 2. See André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” What is Cinema?, trans. Hugh Gray, vol. 1 , p. 12; all further references to this work, abbreviated “OPI,” will be included in the text. See also Rudolf Arnheim, “Melancholy Unshaped,” Toward a Psychology of Art: Collected Essays , p. 186. Kendall L. Walton is professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. He is currently completing a book on representation in the arts. (shrink)

An exploration of modern society and the critical value of popular culture.

Leading scholars offer new readings of Degas1 representations of the family, prostitution, city life and leisure in which looking at women is shown to be a complex and ambiguous process. One major topic of the book is the encounter between feminism and art history. Having put images of women1 on the agenda of cultural analysis, feminist interventions in the theory and analysis of representation have created a diverse and intricate field of interpretation which now supersedes that formulation. These essays challenge (...) art history to confront issues of spectatorship, the interface of class and gender, identification and the politics of vision. This illustrated collection is thus a major contribution to debates on representation and sexuality. (shrink)

Realist theories about fictional entities must explain the fact that, in ordinary contexts people deny, apparently in all seriousness, that there are such things as the Big Bad Wolf and Santa Claus. The usual explanation treats these denials as involving restricted quantification: The speaker is said to be denying only that the Big Bad Wolf and Santa Claus are to be found among real or actual things, not that there are no such things at all. This is unconvincing. The denials (...) may just as naturally be phrased as “The Big Bad Wolf and Santa Claus don't exist”, and claims of nonexistence seem not to admit of interpretations corresponding to statements of restricted quantification. Ordinary denials of the existence of fictional entities constitute a severe difficulty for realist theories. (shrink)